Abstract: This paper examines the relationship of analysts' coverage, forecasting errors and earnings management. To identify analysts' coverage we used the I/B/E/S database, from where we also obtained information on the consensus projections of analysts for listed Brazilian companies, in the period from 1998 to 2004. As an empirical proxy for earnings management we used the model of Kang & Silvaramakrishnan (1995) to estimate discretionary accruals. The correlation tests indicated a negative correlation between the number of analysts covering firms and the magnitude of their discretionary accruals in absolute terms, indicating that more scrutiny inhibits earnings management.
Introduction
Market analysts act as intermediaries by following public companies and preparing earnings projections and investment recommendations. There are various reasons justifying their work, among which their role as gatekeepers stands out, by which they reduce the information asymmetry between investors and management.
Recently analysts have come under withering fire from the specialized press. They have been accused of being unable to predict corporate governance scandals, and worse, of encouraging or motivating questionable earnings management practices.
Although listed firms are required to disclose information periodically to the market, these financials can be very complex and not all users are sophisticated enough to understand their implications. Based on this context, the focus of this study is to identify the association of analysts' coverage with forecasting errors and earnings management in Brazil. Does the number of analysts covering a firm influence its propensity to engage in earnings management? To what extent do analysts serve to monitor managers, discouraging them from opportunistic behavior in disclosing financial information?
Another question investigated is whether the magnitude of forecasting errors is correlated with the number of analysts covering a company. By hypothesis, we consider that as the number of analysts increases, the information asymmetry will decline, enabling better earnings projections.
We focus on analysts' consensus, or street consensus, defined as the average of the earnings projections for a firm in a determined period. Analysis of the consensus projection is based on the idea that a representation of market expectations can be obtained by a measure of the central tendency of the distribution of analysts' projections.
Our objective is to answer these questions in the context of Brazil, to offer additional support to clarify points not yet conclusively resolved in the international literature. Market analysts can play a valuable role in improving corporate governance while at the same time providing their projections on future earnings. These projections allow estimating a key variable in stock valuation models. Identifying good projections of future earnings is a prerequisite for adequate measurement of the fair price of a stock. This paper is organized in five sections including this introduction. In the next section we present the theoretical framework and in the third section we discuss the methodologies followed, such as the empirical proxies for analysts' coverage, earnings management and forecasting errors, along with the nature of the studies carried out. The results are analyzed in the fourth section and the fifth section presents our conclusions.
Literature Review: Analysts' Coverage, Earnings Management and Forecasting

Errors
According to Elgers, Lo and Pfeiffer (2001) , more coverage by analysts is generally associated with greater stock pricing efficiency from the publicly available information. In turn, according to Houston, Lev and Trucker (2006) , the number of analysts that follow a given firm is negatively associated with asymmetric information between the firm and investors. Therefore, the intensity of analysts' coverage has often been used as a proxy for the quality of the information disclosed by firms (Louis & Robinson, 2005 ).
On the relationship of analysts with earnings management, the literature has presented conflicting conclusions. Abarnell & Lehavy (2003) related two types of earnings management to errors in analysts' earnings projections: "taking a bath", when the projections are not reached, and "income-increasing", when earnings are adjusted up to analysts' forecasts. In other studies, Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2001) and Ahmed, Nainar and Zhou (2005) demonstrated that analysts generally do not differentiate between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. However, there is opposite evidence indicating that analysts aggressively downgrade their opinions of firms when they perceive that managers are artificially managing earnings. Brown (2004) examined the association between firms' financial statements and value and found evidence that analysts appear to be aware of the incentives for earnings management. Ke (2001) found a negative relation between the number of analysts following a given firm and the probability of that firm reporting small increases in profits. These results are consistent in indicating that analysts reduce the propensity to manage earnings. Lin & Mcnichols (2004) offered indirect evidence that an increase in the number of analysts following a firm is associated with reduced profits from insider trading. In turn, Lang, Karl and Miller (2004) investigated the relationship between the capital structure and analysts that follow firms, and found that in general analysts avoid following companies with precarious governance structures.
For Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2006) , analysts play an active role in uncovering corporate fraud, greater than that played by regulators and auditors. For example, the involvement of analysts was responsible for the discovery of various cases of corporate fraud in the United States. Finally, Yu (2008) demonstrated that an increase in analysts' coverage reduces the propensity for earnings management.
In Brazil, Paulo, Lima and Lima (2006) tested the effect of analysts' coverage and stated there are no statistically significant differences between firms that are covered and those that are not. According to them, the results can be explained by the fact that managers of Brazilian companies believe financial analysts are incapable of detecting discretionary practices.
Given the active participation of analysts in distributing information, it is reasonable to assume that managers' accounting choices do depend to some extent on the intensity of analysts' coverage. As intermediaries in the flow of private information, analysts inevitably detect some incorrect management practices. This is in line with Jensen & Meckling (1976) , who in their classic article argued that analysts reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership from control, so that analysts in reality are socially productive.
The international literature is nearly unanimous in concluding that analysts tend to be optimistic. This optimistic bias is inferred from the finding that there is a consistently negative difference between real and projected earnings. In other words, analysts' forecast earnings are on the whole higher than the results actually obtained.
This optimism has been documented in studies using the Value Line, I/B/E/S and Zacks databases. The estimates of the degree of analysts' optimism vary according to the study, in function of the different methodologies employed, definition of the variables and period analyzed.
Lim (2001) , using the average of quarterly earnings estimates, found optimism of 0.94% of price. The bias was considerably higher, at 2.5%, for small cap firms, but only 0.53% of price for large cap ones. He also observed a pervasive bias, in every market and all years. Richardson et al. (1999) used individual analysts' projections and projection errors and found that although the positive bias continued to exist, there was a substantial decline, from 0.91% to 0.09% of price, when the projection horizon was reduced from one year to one month. In turn, Brown (1998) , observed that the bias in recent years appeared to have shifted from optimism to pessimism, or at least to virtually no bias.
For analysts of Brazilian firms, an optimistic bias was also documented by Da Silva (1998) and Franco (2000) . Both authors, although using different methods and databases and examining different problems, found the existence of optimism in the earnings projections for Brazilian firms.
According to Kothari (2001) , the factors determining the optimistic bias in analysts' earnings predictions fall into two general categories: a) economic incentives and b) behavioral cognitive bias. Another coherent explanation was offered by Trueman (1994) , who concluded that analysts tend to imitate their peers (herd behavior), seeking to follow the consensus. He evidenced with elegant mathematical models that analysts tend to make projections similar to previous expectations, even when the information is different.
The number of analysts who follow a particular firm can vary widely. Some companies can have over 20 analysts making projections about their future earnings, while for others the number is very small. In this context, it is reasonable to expect the accuracy to improve with a greater number of analysts, based on the assumption that they have a greater volume of information on the firm, and that the portfolio effect (reduced dispersion) improves the quality of the consensus estimation.
Given the richness of the literature on analysts, we narrow our discussion to the role of analysts in earnings management. Are the analysts gatekeepers, so that they curb earnings management? Or analysts balances different pressures and they collude with management compromising their objectivity. The view that analysts succumb to pressure from management suggests that overall, analyst are weak gatekeepers.
Methodology
Database
To relate the performance of analysts with earnings management we carried out the following procedures. To study analysts' projections, we used the I/B/E/S database, from where we obtained information on the consensus projections for listed Brazilian companies in the period from 1998 to 2004. Then we measured their earnings projection error in relation to the real results observed. We also identified the number of analysts following each firm, to define the variable for analysts' coverage.
Since 1971, I/B/E/S has been the most important supplier of earnings forecasts for investment professionals around the world. In this part of the study, we used all the firms for which information was available in the database, with no type of selection.
As a first analysis, we gathered information on analysts' consensus on earnings per share (EPS) for the next year. Among the various metrics available, we found that for EPS forecasts the greatest number of observations were for the current year. This is a key variable based on indicators of the equity/earnings type. Unlike for the American market, where the majority of forecasts are of quarterly results, in Brazil annual predictions predominate.
We collected the EPS projections for each year on a monthly basis. The I/B/E/S systems ascertains monthly the consensus of analysts based on all forecasts until the month before publication of the results. Therefore, the system records the evolution of analysts' EPS consensus for a determined year until the month before announcement of the results. For the accounting data aimed at capturing earnings management, we used the Economática database.
Metric for Forecasting Errors
As a metric to identify analysts' performance, we computed the prediction error (PRED_ERR), defined as the difference between the real earnings (observed) and the projected earnings (estimated). A negative error means a negative surprise, or that the actual earnings fell short of the projections. Likewise, a positive surprise means the actual earnings turned out to be better than projected.
For purposes of comparability, we calculated the prediction errors in terms of actual EPS. Hence, the forecast error for this study is the real minus the predicted EPS divided by the absolute value of the real EPS: We recognize, however, that measuring the forecasting error in terms of the actual earnings per share is not free of problems. For example, for firms with earnings near zero, the errors were exaggeratedly large, and of course we had to exclude observations for which the earnings were nil because of the impossibility of dividing by zero.
Metric for Earnings Management
For the empirical estimate of earnings management we used the model developed by Kang & Silvaramakrishnan (1995) to estimate discretionary accruals [Paulo, Lima and Lima (2006) ]. The proxies for earnings management used in this study were thus discretionary accruals (DA it ) calculated by the KS model, where total accruals are calculated as follows:
where:
TA t = total accruals (operational) of the firm in period t;
∆CA t = variation of current assets of the firm from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t;
∆CL t = variation of current liabilities of the firm from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t;
∆CCE t = variation of cash and cash equivalents of the firm from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t; ∆Debt t = variation of short-term loans and financings of the firm from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t;
Depr t = amount of depreciation recorded by the firm during period t;
A t-1 = Total assets at the end of period t-1.
The discretionary accruals of firm in period t were calculated as follows:
DA t = discretionary accruals of the company in period t;
TA t = total accruals of the firm in period t;
NDA t = non-discretionary accruals of the firm in period t; Kang & Sivaramakrishnan (1995) proposed a model (KS model) to measure accruals and earnings management in the following form:
TA it =total accruals of firm i in period t, weighted by total assets at the end of period t-1;
R it = net revenues of firm i in period t, weighted by total assets at the end of period t-1;
OE it = amount of operating expenses of firm i in period t, excluding expenses for depreciation and amortization, weighted by total assets at the end of period t-
1;
PPE it = balance of gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of period As above, all the variables here are weighted by the total assets at the end of period
The estimated value of discretionary accruals can be calculated directly by the regression error. The KS model uses the instrumental variables method to estimate the regression parameters.
For analysis of the results, we preferred to work with the proxies in terms of absolute value. Therefore, for the majority of the analyses we used the modulus of the forecast error (ABS_ERR) and of the discretionary accruals (ABS_ACC). The closer these are to zero, the smaller are the forecasting error and earnings management, while the larger they are, the greater the forecasting error and earnings management, independent of whether there was, respectively, a negative or positive surprise and upward or downward earnings management.
Analysis of the Results
Before presenting the results, we should explain some descriptive statistics of the main empirical proxies. Table 1 , Panel A, shows there were 5554 observations. Each observation is a consensus prediction by analysts for a particular firm in a determined month.
The average number of analysts covering the firms in our sample was 9.12, with the range being from 2 to 34. Because this coverage can vary significantly among the firms, we divided the firms into classes according to the number of analysts following them.
To define the number of analysts monitoring a determined firm, we verified how many analysts participated in reaching the consensus projection. The average forecasting error (PRED_ERR) of the observations confirms the hypothesis widely stated in the international literature of optimistic bias. The average of the forecasting errors is -0.41. The negative result indicates a negative surprise, i.e., that the earnings projected by analysts were greater than the real result.
To measure earnings management, we used the metric ABN_ACC, which represents discretionary accruals (or abnormal accruals). This metric ranges from negative for companies that manage earnings less to positive for those that manage them more.
Panel B of Table 1 shows some statistics, separated by classes representing the number of analysts covering the firms in the sample. Class 1 represents firms followed by two or three analysts, while firms in Class 2 are covered by four to six analysts, those in Class 3 by seven to eleven and those in Class 4 by more than eleven analysts.
There are significant differences in terms of the average of absolute discretionary accruals and absolute forecasting errors among the classes. 
CLASSES
Panel B: Variables by Analysts Classes
To deepen the investigation, we computed the Spearman correlation coefficient between the variables. The results are shown in Table 2 . This test indicates there is a negative and significant correlation between the number of analysts and the magnitude of discretionary accruals in absolute terms (-0.119), which is in the direction expected.
In other words, this confirms the hypothesis that as the number of analysts following a firm increases, the propensity for earnings management decreases.
Furthermore, there is also a negative and significant correlation between the number of analysts following a firm and the earnings forecast errors (-0.142 is IV, indicating that the companies in this group might be managing their earnings upward (income increasing) to meet or exceed analysts' expectations, to ensure a positive surprise. This is compatible with the argument that companies in some contexts can manage earnings to meet analysts' projections or surprise the market, because of the positive effect this can have on the stock price. In quadrant I, that with the fewest observations, the average of the prediction errors (ABS_ERR) is the highest among all the quadrants (3.17). The firms in this quadrant practice income decreasing earnings management and negatively surprise the market. A possible explanation for this situation is that firms that realize they will not meet analysts' projections anyway may opt for "take a bath" accounting, to set a lower threshold for future comparisons. To obtain more robust results, we carried out multivariate analysis, by performing the following regressions, always with the number of analysts (analysts' coverage) as an independent variable, to explain, respectively, the forecasting errors in absolute terms and the absolute discretionary accruals. The linear regression models were the following: In analyzing the forecasting error, besides the number of analysts we also used a variable to indicate the timing of the prediction. Our hypothesis was that the longer the forecast was made (in days) before the publication of the results, the greater the forecasting errors would tend to be. Evidence of this hypothesis would be a negative coefficient for NUM_ANAL and a positive one for DAYS.
For the model of discretionary accruals, besides the number of analysts, we used a dummy to separate the companies suspected of engaging in earnings management from those not suspected of this practice. We classified as suspect companies those with positive and very small forecasting errors. The premise is that companies manage earnings to meet analysts' expectations, a hypothesis verified in the literature (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckauser, 1999) .
The results are shown in Table 4 . The regressions proved statistically adequate.
It can be seen that the forecasting errors tend to decline as the number of analysts increases. The variable NUM_ANAL was negative and significant (t-statistic of -3.896),
indicating that the more analysts that follow a firm, the smaller the forecasting error is in absolute terms, meaning the more accurate the prediction.
For earnings management, the regression results were also statistically significant, showing that the propensity of firms to manage earnings declines with greater analysts' coverage, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient of the number of analysts (t-statistic of -3.846). The adjusted R 2 was satisfactory in all cases, but to provide further evidence of the robustness of the statistics of the estimated models, we also carried out additional tests (not shown in the tables): i) Jarque-Bera normality test (JB), which indicated that the residuals were normally distributed; ii) variance inflation factor test (VIF), which showed there was no problem of multicollinearity; and iii) Breusch-Godfrey test (BG),
showing no autocorrelation of the residuals. Finally, we performed one more robustness test, by segregating the observations between the two extreme classes of firms: Class 1, covering firms followed by two or three analysts, and Class 4, including firms covered by more than eleven analysts.
The forecasting error is significantly higher for firms in Class 1 than in Class 4.
This indicates that analysts' coverage is an important factor to explain differences in the likelihood of committing forecasting errors. Likewise, firms in Class 1 tend to manage earnings more than those in Class 4, indicating that greater analysts' coverage discourages earnings management. We submitted the differences between classes with respect to prediction errors and discretionary accruals to parametric and nonparametric tests. In all the tests, the differences between these two classes indicated that as the average number of analysts rises, the prediction errors and earnings management decline. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigated the role of analysts' coverage as a mechanism to reduce earnings management and improve consensus earnings forecasts. The results indicate that in the Brazilian context, companies covered by more analysts are less likely to manage earnings, and that as the number of analysts increases, the consensus forecasts become more accurate.
These findings were confirmed by various statistical procedures, both univariate and multivariate tests, as well as by segmenting the observations into different classes of firms according to the number of analysts that follow them and then performing parametric and nonparametric tests. All of these tests indicated the results are robust.
Intuitively, coverage by more analysts should enhance the information environment by reducing information asymmetry between management and investors.
In particular, our results focus on one of sources of reduced asymmetry: the greater the number of analysts following a firm, the less the earnings management. In other words,
analysts not only facilitate distribution of information, they also affect the corporate production of information.
This study contributes to the debate on the role of analysts in the capital market.
Analysts are often criticized for producing imprecise forecasts and making bad investment recommendations. But our results indicate they play a positive role in corporate governance. Not only do their forecasts become more accurate as their coverage increases, the propensity of firms to manage earnings also falls, indicating that analysts play an important gatekeeper role.
While we believe the results demonstrate a statistically significant association between analysts coverage on the one hand and earnings management and earnings prediction accuracy on the other, we cannot rule out the possible endogeneity between analysts' coverage and earnings management or shortcomings of the metrics used as proxies for the number of analysts, forecasting errors and earnings management.
Still, the findings presented in this paper are important to clarify points still not conclusively resolved in the international and Brazilian literature. Analysts, despite the severe criticism they receive in the specialized press, really do play a useful role in monitoring firms and provided earnings forecasts. These predictions provide a key variable in models to evaluate fair stock prices, allowing investors to make more informed decisions.
